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This paper examines how a government-run cash transfer program targeted to poor 
mothers in rural Ecuador influenced the health and development of their children. This 
program is of particular interest because, unlike other transfer programs that have been 
implemented recently in Latin America, receipt of the cash transfers was not conditioned 
on specific parental actions, such as taking children to health clinics or sending them to 
school. This feature of the program makes it possible to assess whether conditionality is 
necessary for programs to have beneficial effects on children. Random assignment at the 
parish level is used to identify the program’s effects. We find that the cash transfer 
program had positive effects on the physical, cognitive, and socio-emotional development 
of children, and the treatment effects were substantially larger for the poorer children 
than for less poor children. Among the poorest children in our sample, children whose 
mothers were eligible for transfers had outcomes that were on average more than 20 
percent of a standard deviation higher than those for comparable children in the control 
group. Treatment effects are somewhat larger for girls and for children with more highly-
educated mothers. We examine three mechanisms—better nutrition, greater use of health 
care, and better parenting—through which the transfers might influence child 
development. The program appeared to improve children’s nutrition and increased the 
chance they were treated for helminth infections. However, children in the treatment 
group were not more likely to visit health clinics for growth monitoring, and the mental 
health and parenting of their mothers did not improve.  
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I. Introduction 
In 2003, the government of Ecuador launched a new cash transfer program—the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH)—targeted to poor families with children. The 
transfer is small—only $15 per month per family—but it represents a non-trivial 10 
percent increase in family expenditure for the average eligible family. Unlike transfers 
made by a variety of programs in Latin America, including the much-studied 
Oportunidades program in Mexico (formerly known as PROGRESA), in Ecuador women 
in eligible families have received what is referred to as “the Bono” with no strings 
attached. 
Random assignment was built into the roll-out of the BDH. Two separate 
randomized experiments were conducted. One was designed to examine the effects of the 
Bono on poverty and educational attainment among school-aged children. The other 
experiment—which is the concern of this paper—was designed to examine how the Bono 
affected the health and development of pre-school aged children. Parishes were randomly 
assigned to “treatment” and “control” groups. In treatment parishes, poor families with 
pre-school aged children were eligible to receive the Bono early in the roll-out, in control 
parishes families were not offered the Bono until several years later. The families under 
study were interviewed prior to the introduction of the BDH, and again before the control 
parishes were included in the program.  
The randomized introduction of the BDH provides an opportunity to answer a 
basic question: How do cash transfers affect the health and development of young 
children? This question is important because poor health and delayed development in 
early childhood may have long-lasting consequences for health and economic status. 
Studies from developed countries that have tracked children into adulthood show that 
healthier and taller children do better on tests of cognitive ability; these children grow 
into taller adults, and earn significantly higher wages (Case and Paxson 2006; see also 
Connolly, Micklewright, and Nickell, 1992; Currie and Thomas, 1999; Feinstein, 2003; 
Robertson and Symons, 2003). In poor countries, early childhood developmental 
outcomes also appear to be important for success in early adulthood. A recent review 
paper makes the case that early cognitive and socio-emotional development is a strong 
predictor of school attainment in Guatemala, South Africa, the Philippines, Jamaica and   2
Brazil, even after controlling for wealth and maternal education (Grantham-McGregor et 
al., 2007). The authors conclude that at least 200 million children in the developing world 
fail to reach their potential in cognitive development, with serious consequences for their 
health as adults and for their earnings capacity.  
There is clear evidence that, within developing countries, children from lower 
income families are more likely to experience worse health and to do less well on 
assessments of cognitive and behavioral development. However, there is much less 
evidence on whether improvements in income levels result in healthier children with 
better developmental outcomes. The difficulty establishing causal effects of income on 
children’s outcomes is clear: while money may improve children’s health and 
development, it could be that families that are better equipped to earn higher incomes are 
also better able to produce and nurture healthier and more able children. If so, income 
transfers may not have sizeable effects on child outcomes. It is also possible that cross-
sectional comparisons of children’s outcomes in families with more or less income may 
understate the likely impact of cash transfers. Even with no strings attached, recipients of 
cash from a social program may use it differently from other sources of income. Women 
may also have different preferences from men, and cash transfers made to women may 
have larger beneficial effects on children’s wellbeing than one would conclude from 
simple comparisons of outcomes in households with different income levels. 
The existing literature provides some evidence that income transfers may improve 
children’s health and developmental outcomes, perhaps especially when these transfers 
are made to women. A number of papers use data from South Africa to test whether 
children in households that are eligible for large cash transfers have better outcomes 
(Duflo, 2003, Case, 2001; Agüero, Carter, and Woolard, 2006). All of these studies report 
positive program effects. For example, Duflo (2003) uses a quasi-experimental design to 
show that girls whose grandmothers receive transfers have large improvements in weight 
and height.  
A number of recent studies have examined the impact of conditional cash transfer 
programs on children’s health and developmental outcomes in Latin America. In all of 
these programs, women in poor households receive cash transfers only if their pre-school 
children receive regular health checkups and their school-aged children are enrolled in   3
school. Several papers indicate that, after about 18 months, children who received cash 
transfers from the Oportunidades program in Mexico were about 1 centimeter taller than 
comparable children who did not receive the transfers, although the findings are 
somewhat sensitive to the choice of sample and estimation method (Gertler, 2004; 
Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005; Rivera et al., 2004). Conditional cash transfer programs 
have also been found to have positive effects on child nutritional status in Nicaragua 
(Maluccio and Flores, 2004) and, among younger children in rural areas, in Colombia 
(Attanasio et al., 2005), but not in Honduras (Hoddinott, 2004) or Brazil (Morris et al., 
2004). More recently, information has been collected on the cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes of children from the Oportunidades study. Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld 
(2006), exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the size of the transfers received by 
beneficiaries, conclude that larger transfers resulted in better nutritional status, motor 
skills, and cognitive development, possibly due to improvements in the quantity and 
quality of food consumed.  
This paper presents results on the effects of an unconditional cash transfer 
program on the health and development of children between the ages of 3 and 7 from 
rural Ecuador. Children in this age range were given a common, comprehensive battery 
of tests aimed at measuring their nutritional status and their cognitive and motor abilities. 
Their mothers were asked to report on their behavior problems. Taken together, these 
data permit a broad assessment of how cash transfers influence health and development. 
Unlike the previous Latin American studies discussed above, receipt of the cash transfers 
was not conditional on health center visits or enrollment in school. This design feature 
provides an opportunity for assessing whether or not conditionality is a prerequisite for 
cash transfers to benefit children.  
The following section of the paper provides a brief overview of the associations 
between economic status and children’s health and developmental outcomes, with a focus 
on the possible mechanisms through which cash transfers might benefit children. Section 
III describes the Ecuador experiment and our data. Section IV discusses the methods we 
use in our analysis. Results are presented in Section V. We conclude with a discussion of 
the implications of our results for the design of transfer programs.   4
II. Economic Status and Child Development in Poor Countries 
An enormous literature on health in developing countries documents the fact that 
children from more disadvantaged families—those with lower incomes and less parental 
education—display higher rates of mortality and morbidity. Within many countries, 
infants and children from less well-off families are more likely to die, to be stunted or 
wasted, and to experience a variety of illness conditions such as diarrhea, respiratory 
infections and measles. (See, for example, Desai and Alva, 1998 and Haddad et al., 2003, 
which provide evidence on a large number of countries.)  
The literature on economic gradients in children’s developmental outcomes in 
poor countries is less extensive. Results are often based on small samples that are not 
nationally representative. However, the evidence generally indicates that poverty is 
associated with developmental deficits across a variety of domains. For example, Gertler 
and Fernald (2004) provide evidence that, among low-income Mexican children, those 
that are poorer have smaller vocabularies than other children of the same age, and also 
score worse on several tests of cognitive development. Halpern et al. (1996) document 
that there are clear income gradients in language, social and motor development among 
Brazilian children. Paxson and Schady (2007) show that age-adjusted vocabulary size in 
Ecuador is smaller among children from less-wealthy families, and the wealth gradient in 
vocabulary size for older children is larger than that for younger children. An association 
between low socioeconomic status and poor child development has been found among 
children 12 months and younger in Egypt, Brazil and India, and among toddlers in 
Bangladesh (see the review by Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007).
1 
  There are several mechanisms through which economic status could affect 
developmental outcomes. One is that families with lower incomes invest less in goods 
that promote children’s development. Nutrition may be an important “investment good” 
that changes with income. Poorer children may be more likely to experience nutritional 
deficits—in calories, iron, and other micronutrients such as zinc and iodine—that 
adversely effect cognitive development, motor development, and social and behavioral 
outcomes. A large body of evidence indicates that nutrition and development are related, 
                                                 
1 One exception is Fernald et al. (2006), who find that, although the nutritional status and mental 
development of low-income Mexican children falls farther behind US norms as children go from 13 to 24 
months of age, these declines are not associated with socioeconomic status.   5
although distinguishing between the specific effects of different nutritional deficits is 
difficult due to their frequent co-occurrence (Grantham-McGregor and Baker-
Henningham, 2005). Protein energy malnutrition is associated with impaired cognitive 
performance (Pollitt, 2000). Iron deficiency is associated with lower IQ, poorer memory, 
altered social and emotional behavior, and less developed motor skills (Grantham-
McGregor and Ani, 2001). Animal studies have identified plausible biological 
mechanisms for these effects (Lozoff et al., 2006). The evidence on the role of other 
micronutrients is more mixed (Black, 2003; Ani and Grantham-McGregor, 1999). There 
is consensus that iodine deficiency, especially during the prenatal period, is related to 
cognitive impairment, but that the evidence for the importance of zinc and vitamins is 
quite weak. Choline, a nutrient found in beef liver, chicken liver and eggs, has been 
shown to be important for brain development in rat pups (Zeisel, 2006) but there is not 
yet conclusive evidence of its importance in humans. 
  Poorer families may also invest less in their children’s health care, or live in areas 
with lower-quality health care facilities. This could affect developmental outcomes in 
several ways. One is that, in poor countries, primary health care is typically aimed at 
monitoring children’s growth and nutritional status and taking remedial actions if 
children are thought to be inadequately nourished. Interventions could include the use of 
iron supplements, de-worming treatments, or the provision of supplements to pregnant 
and lactating women. If health care helps ensure that children are adequately nourished, it 
could improve developmental outcomes through the mechanisms discussed above. Health 
care may also treat diseases such as diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, and vaccinate against 
others, such as measles. Some of these conditions have been shown to impair growth and 
hinder development. For example, malaria is associated with cognitive impairments and 
loss of fine motor control (see cites in Sachs and Malaney, 2002). Finally, health care 
services may provide mothers with health information that helps them to protect 
children’s nutritional status and prevent illnesses. 
  Nutrition and health care are not the only routes through which economic status 
might affect developmental outcomes. In developed countries, research has focused on 
how the quality of parenting, the home environment, and child care (if relevant) influence 
early child development. A recent Institute of Medicine report on child development   6
stresses children’s needs for close and dependable relationships, and “cognitively and 
linguistically rich environments” (Shonkoff and Philips, 2000, p. 9) There is no reason to 
think that these factors are not equally important in poor countries. For example, a 
randomized-design study of malnourished Jamaican children indicates that psychosocial 
stimulation can have long-term benefits for child development in a developing country 
setting (Walker et al., 2005). Similar findings have been reported for South Africa, China, 
Turkey, Brazil, and Vietnam (see the review by Walker et al., 2007). There are two routes 
through which increases in incomes could improve the quality of children’s home 
environments. First, parents might spend more on materials or activities that stimulate 
children, or enroll them in early educational activities. Second, higher incomes could 
reduce stress or depression among parents, leading to more nurturing behaviors. For 
example, children of depressed mothers are found to have reduced levels of cognition and 
a higher incidence of behavioral problems in a variety of settings, including studies from 
a number of developed countries, as well as in South Africa, Barbados, and India (cited in 
Walker et al., 2007). 
  Although there are numerous reasons to think that increases in incomes may 
improve children’s health and developmental outcomes, there are also reasons why this 
may not be the case. For example, the worse health and developmental outcomes of 
poorer children could be due to parents’ lack of information about what should be done to 
promote health and development. Even in this case, cash transfers could improve 
children’s outcomes if (for instance) they permit families to move to neighborhoods with 
healthier environments, better-quality services, or more well-informed neighbors. But, it 
could also be that children of less healthy and able parents (who are, as a consequence, 
less wealthy) are themselves less healthy and able. In this case, the association between 
income and children’s developmental outcomes does not represent a causal relationship, 
and cash transfers will not improve children’s outcomes. The randomized intervention 
studied here makes it possible to examine whether this is the case.   
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III. Experimental Design and Data Collection 
The BDH 
In 2003, the Ecuadorian government began restructuring its social assistance 
programs in an effort to improve both child health and education. Between 1998 and 
2003, the largest social assistance program in the country was the Bono Solidario, which 
provided unconditional cash transfers of US $15 per month to participating families with 
children. (Ecuador adopted the US dollar as national currency in January 2000.) This 
program, which accounted for approximately 0.75 percent of GDP in 2002, has since 
been phased out. One source of dissatisfaction with the Bono Solidario was that it was 
never tightly means-tested. Although the incidence of the Bono Solidario was 
progressive, there was substantial “leakage” to non-poor families and undercoverage of 
poor families. In 1999, 49.8 percent of families in the poorest quintile received transfers, 
as did 27.4 percent of families in the top two wealthiest quintiles. (These statistics are 
based on our calculations from household survey data using the nationally representative 
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.) The “leakage” was primarily due to the fact 
that, at the program’s inception, enrollment was done on a voluntary basis: all women 
with children were free to enroll. Undercoverage of the poor was a consequence of the 
fact that registration was done on a first-come first-served basis. Many poor families, and 
especially newly formed families, were unable to register.  
Beginning in mid-2003, the Bono Solidario was gradually replaced with a new 
program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). The BDH differs from the Bono 
Solidario in that it is means-tested. Starting in 2001, the government of Ecuador invested 
significant effort into developing a family means-test. Fully 85 percent of families in 
rural areas and poorer urban areas of Ecuador were surveyed and assigned a poverty 
index (called the Selben index) that is used to assess eligibility for the BDH. Only 
families in the first two quintiles of the Selben index are eligible for BDH. Transfers are 
distributed through the banking system, and are given directly to mothers rather than 
fathers. When the program was originally designed, the cash transfer of $15 per month 
was meant to be conditional on taking children younger than age six for bi-monthly visits   8
to public health clinics and sending school-aged children to school. However, for a 
variety of logistical reasons, the conditionality was never implemented.  
 
The experiment 
The BDH was rolled out slowly across the country, providing us with an 
opportunity to randomize parishes into a treatment group and a control group. We 
selected six provinces—three coastal provinces and three provinces in the highlands—in 
which to conduct the study. Together, these provinces contain 378 parishes. (The parish 
is the smallest administrative unit in Ecuador, roughly equal to a village in rural areas.) 
These parishes were stratified into urban and rural groups. A total of 118 parishes were 
selected: 51 rural and 28 urban treatment parishes, and 26 rural and 13 urban control 
parishes.
2 If conditionality had been implemented, the treatment parishes would have 
been divided into a group that received conditional cash transfers and a group that 
received unconditional cash transfers. 
  The BDH is structured so that all families with children in the first two quintiles 
of the Selben index are eligible to receive transfers once the BDH is implemented in their 
parishes. We refer to these families as “BDH-eligible.” Because the purpose of this study 
was to examine the effects of the program on the health of young children, we studied 
only a subset of BDH-eligible families. Specifically, to be eligible for inclusion in our 
sample, families had to be in the first two quintiles of the Selben index, have at least one 
child under the age of 6, have no children ages 6 or above, and to have not been 
recipients of the Bono Solidario. We refer to these families as “sample eligible” families. 
We excluded BDH-eligible families with older children because, in the event that the 
program became conditional, the conditionality would work differently for families with 
school-aged children than for families with (only) younger children. This exclusion 
turned out, ex post, to be unnecessary. We excluded families who were recipients of the 
Bono Solidario because these families were not newly-eligible for transfers: instead, they 
were simply being converted from the old program to the new program.  
                                                 
2 The numbers of parishes selected was chosen to yield approximately 1200 treatment and 600 control 
families in rural and urban areas.   9
  The sample selection criteria that were used mean that the families in our sample 
are not representative of all BDH-eligible families in the six provinces chosen. A 
particular concern is that the families that managed to gain access to the Bono Solidario 
may have been systematically different from those who were newly eligible: they may 
have been better able to “work the system” to gain entrance to the Bono or, conversely, 
may have been more needy and given higher priority. We have information from 
government records for all BDH-eligible families in the parishes we sampled, including 
their SelBen scores, and so can compare the scores of sample-eligible families with those 
who were excluded due to former Bono receipt, or because of the presence of older 
children.  
Results of these tabulations are shown in Table 1. The table contains information 
on BDH-eligible families in our sampled parishes: all are poor, and all have at least one 
child. These families are divided into those who already received the Bono and those who 
were newly-eligible; and also into those who had only children under the age of 6 and 
those who had at least one child age 6 and older. Table 1 indicates that 17,987 families—
shown in the bottom right quadrant of the table—were “sample-eligible.” The families in 
our survey were selected from this group. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that, as expected, “young” families—those with 
only younger children—are more likely than others to be newly-eligible: 80.2 percent of 
these families are newly-eligible, in contrast to 26.7 percent of families with older 
children. The Selben scores—which range from 11 to 51, with higher values 
corresponding to greater wealth—indicate that younger families are on average wealthier 
than older families. (We suspect this is because household size was a factor in assigning 
Selben scores.) This is true for both newly eligible families and those who were former 
recipients of the Bono. More important, however, is the finding that newly-eligible 
families are only slightly less wealthy (as measured by the Selben index) than families 
with only young children who are former Bono recipients. This difference in wealth is to 
be expected, given that the Bono recipients have been receiving transfers while the newly 
eligible families have not. Large wealth differences would raise concerns that the newly-
eligible families were selectively different from the rest of the population.    10
Up to 50 eligible families were selected from each parish (some parishes had 
fewer than 50 sample-eligible families), resulting in a sample of 3,426 families 
containing 5,547 children. A baseline survey that collected information on household 
characteristics and health status was administered between October 2003 and September 
2004. Rural families in the treatment parishes became eligible to receive transfers in June 
2004, and urban treatment families became eligible to receive transfers in November 
2004. A follow-up survey, which collected more detailed information on the health of 
mother and children and children’s developmental outcomes, was conducted between 
September 2005 and January 2006, with a response rate of 94.1 percent. On average, 
rural families in the treatment group (who we study in this paper) were eligible for the 
transfer for 17 months prior to the follow-up survey. 
Figure 1 shows information from banking records on the receipt of transfers for 
all rural families in our sample, through November 2006. The top panel shows the 
fraction of families that received the transfer in the month indicated; the bottom shows 
the average transfer over all families. The figure indicates that take-up of the transfer 
among families in the control group was nearly non-existent: 41 families in the control 
group (3.7%) are reported to have received transfers in at least one month since June 
2004, when the new program was implemented in the treatment parishes. Of these, 12 
families (1.1%) are reported to have received transfers in the five months prior to the 
rollout of the new program. A similar fraction of families from treatment parishes was 
reported to have received transfers prior to June. This could be due to mistakes in the 
banking records. Alternatively, it could be that some families that were not “newly 
eligible” were mistakenly included in the sample, because of errors in the government’s 
records of who was and was not receiving the Bono Solidario.  
The fraction of treatment families who received transfers climbed relatively 
quickly once the program became available, reaching 56 percent by January 2005 and 60 
percent by January 2006. Actual program take-up was higher. Eligible families were not 
required to withdraw their $15 on a monthly basis, but could allow transfers to 
accumulate for up to 4 months, and the 60 percent figure measures the fraction who 
withdrew the money in any given month. Overall, 75 percent of sampled families in the 
treatment parishes received a transfer in at least one month since June 2004. The average   11
monthly transfer across all treatment-group families, between January 2005 and 
November 2006, was $10.51.  
 
Outcome measures 
The results presented in this paper are based on a sample of rural children who 
were 3 to 7 years old at the follow-up survey. We use this sample to examine the effects 
of the BDH on eight health and developmental outcomes, which we classify into three 
measures of physical outcomes and five measures of cognitive and behavioral outcomes.  
Physical outcomes: We consider three measures of physical development: the 
child’s hemoglobin level, height-for-age, and fine motor control. Hemoglobin was 
measured using a finger-prick blood draw. We used information on the elevations of each 
of the parishes to convert these to elevation-adjusted measures, using procedures 
published by the Centers for Disease Control (Centers for Disease Control, 1989). 
Heights were measured using stadiometers. In some of the results that follow, we convert 
heights to age- and sex-adjusted z-scores using US norms.
3 Fine motor control was 
assessed using a pegboard exercise. Children were asked to put pegs into a pegboard, 
twice using their dominant hand and twice using their non-dominant hand. These four 
times were averaged together. The final score in measured in seconds, so that lower 
values indicate faster times.  
Cognitive and behavioral outcomes: We use five measures of cognitive and 
behavioral outcomes. The first is the Test de Vocabulario en Imágenes Peabody (TVIP), 
the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a widely-used test 
of receptive vocabulary that was administered to children ages 36 months and older.
4 
Children’s cognitive abilities were assessed using three tests drawn from the Woodcock-
Johnson-Muñoz battery (Woodcock and Muñoz, 1996). These scales have been used to 
assess the effects of interventions in early childhood on cognitive development in a 
variety of contexts (see, for example, Lozoff et al., 1991; Yeung et al., 2002; Lee et al., 
2002; Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2006). The first is a test of long-term memory 
                                                 
3 Height-for-age z-scores were computed using growth charts produced by the Centers for Disease Control. 
The CDC provides programs to compute z-scores: 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/growthcharts/sas.htm. 
4 See, for example, Umbel et al., 1992; Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Blau and Grossberg, 1992; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994; Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2006; and Paxson and Schady, 2007.   12
(which we denote WJ-1, since it is the first test in the battery). Children are gradually 
“introduced” to a series of space creatures with nonsensical names, and then are shown 
groups of space creatures which they are asked to identify. This test taps long-term 
memory because children must recall the names of creatures they were introduced to 
early in the test. The second (denoted WJ-2) measures short-term memory, or immediate 
recall. The interviewer reads the child increasingly complex sentences, which the child 
repeats back. The final cognitive test (WJ-5) measures visual integration, or visual-spatial 
processing. Children are shown a series of pictures of common objects that have been 
distorted in various ways—for example, a picture of a boat with several of the lines 
missing, or with a pattern superimposed on top of the picture—and are asked to identify 
the object. Finally, we assessed behavior problems with a commonly-used scale, which is 
based on mother’s reports of the frequency that a child displays each of 29 behaviors. 
Maternal outcomes: Some of our analyses use information on four measures of 
mother’s physical and mental health. The first is a measure of the mother’s hemoglobin 
level, which is adjusted for both elevation and pregnancy. The second is the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD), a widely-used measure of depression 
(Radloff, 1977). The third is a measure of maternal punitiveness and lack of warmth. This 
consists of 8 interviewer-assessed items, and is based on the HOME scale (see Bradley, 
1993; Paxson and Schady, 2007). The last measure is the mother’s score on the 4-item 
version of the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). This is a frequently-used measure of the 
extent to which life events are perceived to be stressful (Cohen et al., 1983). For all three 
measures of mental health (the CESD, HOME and PSS), lower scores are better. We also 
examined whether there were effects of the treatment on maternal labor supply, since 
reductions in labor supply due to the program could improve the quality of parenting 
children receive. We use two measures of labor supply: work hours per week on paid 
jobs, and work hours per week on all jobs, whether paid or as unpaid. Two final measures 
we use are based on the mother’s report of her subjective social status, using the 
“MacArthur ladders”.
5 Mothers were shown a picture of a ladder with 10 rungs, and were 
told that higher rungs correspond to higher socioeconomic status. They were asked to 
                                                 
5 For a description and bibliography of papers that use MacArthur ladders, see the MacArthur Foundation’s 
Network on SES and Health website: 
http://www.macses.ucsf.edu/Research/Psychosocial/notebook/subjective.html.    13
place themselves on the ladder in relation to everyone in their communities, and in 
relation to everyone in Ecuador. We use the ladder scores as crude measures of economic 
status. The “community” and “Ecuador” ladders provide information on whether the 
subjective standing of those in the treatment group increases relative to those in the 
control group. 
In the analyses that follow, we examine whether there is heterogeneity in 
treatment effects across more and less poor families. The baseline survey did not include 
an expenditure module, but did collect information on housing characteristics and 
ownership of a list of household durables. A companion study of the effects of the BDH 
on the educational attainment of older children (conducted in different parishes) collected 
the same information on housing and durables, and included an expenditure module. We 
used data from this study to estimate a regression of the logarithm of monthly 
expenditure on measures of housing characteristics, durable goods ownership and several 
household characteristics such as the household head’s age and education level, and 
household size, and used the resulting coefficients to impute the logarithm of expenditure 
for our sample. 
 
Analysis sample   
The main results in this paper are based on analyses of a sample of 1,479 children 
in 1,124 families who were ages 3 to 7 at follow-up, whose families were interviewed in 
both the baseline and follow-up surveys, and for whom information on all eight outcomes 
and expenditure is available.
6 The use of this sample raises two possible concerns. The 
first is sample attrition, and more specifically whether attrition differed across families in 
the treatment and control groups. Attrition in our sample is low—only 6 percent of the 
original families could not be found at follow-up—and is uncorrelated with whether a 
family lived in a parish assigned to the treatment group. Statistics presented in Appendix 
Table 1 indicate that baseline family and child characteristics are similar across those 
who were and were not found at follow-up.  
                                                 
6 We excluded 46 children whose mothers did not speak Spanish. The language-based developmental tests 
were not available in indigenous languages.   14
The second concern is whether the children who have missing data on any of the 
outcomes are systematically different from those for whom complete information is 
available. Approximately one-third of children are missing data on one or more 
outcomes. The majority of missing values were due to the mother being unwilling to 
allow the finger-prick blood draw required for the hemoglobin measurement (441 cases). 
Other missing values were due to a variety of causes, such as an invalid height 
measurement or the failure to take a cognitive test. Again, the statistics shown in 
Appendix Table 1 indicate few differences in baseline characteristics between the full 
sample of families and children and those who had no missing child outcome measures. 
Children with non-missing values tended to be somewhat older than those with missing 
values: the average age of children with no missing outcome measures was 38.9 months 
old at baseline, versus 34.5 months for children with at least one missing outcome 
measure. (A similar age gap was observed at follow-up.) This pattern is consistent with 
mothers being more reluctant to subject younger children to a blood draw, or interviewers 
finding it more difficult for younger children to cooperate with cognitive tests. However, 




Sample means and socioeconomic gradients in child and mother outcomes 
We begin by examining whether there are differences at baseline between 
families in the treatment and control groups. Since many of the results reported below 
focus on treatment effects for children in the lowest quartile of per capita expenditures, 
we also present means for for those in the poorest quartile. Several features of the results, 
shown in Table 2, are notable. First, differences in baseline characteristics between the 
treatment and control groups are small in magnitude and never significant—as one would 
expect if assignment was in fact random. This is true for the sample as a whole, as well as 
for families and children in the poorest quartile. Second, the table shows that children in 
the sample are disadvantaged. The average value of per capita monthly expenditure is 
                                                 
7 We regressed an indicator for whether any child outcomes were missing on an indicator for whether the 
child was in the treatment group, clustering standard errors at the parish level. The coefficient on the 
treatment indicator is 0.02, with a standard error of 0.06.   15
$37.23, or about $1.25 per capita per day. For households in the poorest quartile, the 
comparable value is $21.75 per capita or $0.73 per capita per day. Children have 
relatively young mothers (around 24 years old) with around 7 years of completed 
schooling on average. A large fraction of mothers completed exactly 6 years of 
schooling, indicating that they did not progress beyond primary school. Slightly more 
than 30 percent of mothers, and 47 percent of the poorest mothers, are not living with a 
husband or partner. This is not the result of migration of male partners: of the 637 
children with fathers who did not live in their homes, only 91 had fathers who had 
migrated elsewhere. Finally, many of these children had significant health problems at 
baseline. The average height-for-age z-score, computed using US norms, is around –1.1, 
and fully 27.2 percent of the children are stunted (i.e. have a z-score less than –2). The 
average level of hemoglobin is 10.4, which is low given that values below 11.0 to 11.5 
(depending on the child’s age) indicate anemia, and 68.4 percent of children in our 
sample were anemic at baseline.
8 The mean standardized TVIP (receptive language) 
score at baseline for children in the sample is 82.9, more than one standard deviation 
below the mean of 100 for the sample of children that were used to norm the test.  
  Even within this poor sample of children, there are striking differences in 
children’s health and developmental outcomes across poorer and less poor families. To 
show this, we estimated non-parametric regressions of each outcome on the imputed 
logarithm of per capita expenditure for families in parishes randomly assigned to the 
control group—so that the patterns observed are not influenced by the BDH. To makes it 
easier to draw comparisons across outcomes, we first converted each outcome into a 
within-sample z-score by subtracting the sample median and dividing by the standard 
deviation.
9 Also, we reversed the signs on the measures of fine motor control and the 
behavioral problem index, so that higher values correspond to “better” outcomes (as with 
the other outcomes). The results, graphed in Figure 2, include dashed lines at the 25
th and 
75
th percentiles of the expenditure measure. The figure shows that for most of the 
measures of physical, cognitive and behavioral development, children with higher per 
                                                 
8 Using CDC guidelines, the cut-offs for anemia are 11.1 g/dl for children between the ages of 2 and 5, and 
11.5 for children between 5 and 8 (Centers for Disease Control, 1989). 
9 For the vocabulary test, cognitive tests and height, we did not use published norms, but converted to 
within-sample z-scores, without age adjustment, directly from the raw scores. All of our regression results 
include a set of indicators for the age of the child, in months, at the time of testing.    16
capita expenditure levels have noticeably better outcomes. In many cases there are clear 
non-linearities in this relationship: Fine motor control, vocabulary (TVIP), and the two 
tests of memory (WJ-1 and WJ-2) all appear to improve sharply for children in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution of per capita expenditure; at higher expenditure levels, 
outcomes improve more slowly or do not improve at all.  
Several of the measures of mother’s outcomes also vary with expenditure. Figure 
3 shows results of nonparametric regressions of the maternal physical and mental health 
measures on the logarithm of per capita expenditure for families in the control group. 
Here, too, all scores have been converted to within-sample z-scores, with signs reversed 
where necessary so that higher values correspond to better outcomes. The results for 
maternal hemoglobin are similar to those for children, in that increases in expenditure are 
associated with increases in hemoglobin. Poorer mothers are more likely to be rated by 
interviewers as being harsh and unresponsive to their children (HOME score), and 
somewhat more likely to report feeling stressed. There is, however, no clear relationship 
between depression and per capita expenditure. The relationships between the raw ladder 
scores and expenditure are shown in Figure 4. As might be expected, ladder rankings 
increase with expenditure, and mothers rank themselves higher on the community ladders 
than on the Ecuador ladders. The predicted value on the community ladder does not 
exceed 4 even for the wealthiest mothers in out sample, and the predicted ranking on the 
Ecuador ladder does not exceed 2.5. These low rankings are consistent with the fact that 
only those in the bottom two quintiles of Selben index are eligible for BDH transfers.  
 
IV. Methods  
We present intent-to-treat estimates, using regressions of the following form: 
(1)  k k k k X T Y ε β α + + = , k=1…K,  
where  k Y  is the kth child outcome (out of 8), T is a treatment indicator which takes on the 
value of one for children in parishes randomly assigned to receive the BDH in the early 
roll-out phase, and X is a set of controls (including an intercept). To make it easier to 
compare results across outcomes, we continue using outcome measures that have been 
converted to within-sample z-scores, with higher values corresponding to better 
outcomes. The coefficients on the treatment indicator therefore measure effect sizes in   17
standard deviation units. In most specifications, X includes only indicators for the child’s 
age, in single month indicators, and an indicator for the child’s gender. As a robustness 
check, we also show results that include controls for a set of baseline family 
characteristics, including the log of imputed expenditure, an indicator for whether the 
mother lived with a husband at baseline, the mother’s years of education and age, and 
indicators for the numbers of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 14, 15 to 44, 
45 to 64 and 64 or older) crossed with gender, and the mother’s TVIP score.
10  
  We also estimate the average treatment effect, across all 8 outcome measures, and 








α α . 
These averages provide useful summary measures of the effects of the program, and have 
the advantage that they may be more precisely estimated than the individual treatment 
effects. In practice, we estimate (1) by running seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
for all 8 outcomes, and using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates to 
calculate the standard error of α . All standard errors are clustered at the parish level. 
  The non-parametric estimates in Figure 2 indicate that the relationship between 
outcomes and expenditures are nonlinear, implying that the effects of transfers may also 
differ across poorer and wealthier families in our sample. To see if this is the case, we 
estimate variants of (1) that permit the effects of the transfer to differ for families in the 
lowest quartile of per capita expenditure distribution, and the rest of the sample.
11 
Specifically, we estimate: 






                                                 
10 The mother’s TVIP score is included because a child’s cognitive test scores is likely to be highly 
correlated with his or her mother’s vocabulary. The mother’s TVIP was measured at follow-up rather than 
baseline: it is possible (although unlikely) that her vocabulary could be affected by BDH transfers, in which 
case it should not be included in the list of controls. However, excluding this measure has very little effect 
on the results. 
11 Alternatively, we divided the sample into households above and below the median of per capita 
expenditures, or into four separate quartiles. These results suggest that differences in program effects are 
particularly apparent between households in the lowest quartile and other households, rather than for 
households above and below the median, or for households in other expenditure quartiles.    18
where  j Q indicates which group the family belongs to. Finally, we perform a number of 
robustness checks, and estimate equation (3) by child age, sex and gender. The rationales 
for these extensions are described in more detail, below. 
 
V. Results 
Main results for children’s outcomes 
  The main results for children’s outcomes, presented in Table 3, show modest 
treatment effects. The estimated treatment effects for individual outcomes are statistically 
significant only for fine motor control, which is predicted to be 16 percent of a standard 
deviation higher among the treatment group than in the control group, and long-term 
memory, which is predicted to be 19.2 percent of a standard deviation higher among the 
treatment group. Note, however, that all the effects are positive, regardless of the controls 
that are included. The average effect size for the measures of physical outcomes 
(hemoglobin, height, and final motor control) is 10.6 percent of a standard deviation with 
a standard error of 4.9 percent, while the average program effect for the cognitive and 
behavioral measures (vocabulary recognition, long-term memory, short-term memory, 
visual integration, and the behavior problems scale) is 10.1 percent of a standard 
deviation, with a standard error of 7.1 percent.
12 Results are similar when the extended 
set of controls is included.  
   We next turn to results that allow program effects to vary by expenditure group. 
These results, shown in Table 4, support the idea that treatment effects are larger for the 
poorest families. There is no evidence of significant treatment effects for children in the 
top three quartiles—either for any individual measure, or for the averages across groups 
of measures. By contrast, for households in the bottom quartile, there are significant 
effects on hemoglobin (39.0 percent of a standard deviation), fine motor control (28.8 
percent of a standard deviation), long-term memory (22.8 percent of a standard 
                                                 
12 It is plausible that two of the outcomes—height and the TVIP score—cannot be expected to change 
substantially over short periods for children past infancy. Height is a “stock” which reflects the 
accumulated effects of nutrition and disease over the child’s life. Similarly, the TVIP score measures 
language accumulation over childhood, and reflects both cognitive ability and language exposure. When 
these two variables are excluded from the estimates of average effects, the sizes rise to 0.138 (0.069) for 
physical outcomes, 0.124 (0.069) for cognitive and behavioral outcomes, and 0.129 (0.061) for all 
measures. These result simply that the short-run impact of the program may be larger than the more 
conservative estimates shown in the table.    19
deviation), and the behavior problems scale (38.9 percent of a standard deviation). In 
contrast to findings from the Oportunidades study, discussed above, the smallest 
treatment effect is for child height. Child height may be particularly difficult to change in 
the short run, especially among children past infancy, given that it is a “stock” variable 
that reflects a child’s cumulative history of nutritional intake and disease. On average, 
children in the lowest expenditure quartile who are eligible for BDH transfers have 
physical outcomes that are 24.3 percent higher than those in the control group (with a 
standard error of 6.5 percent), and cognitive and behavioral outcomes that are 25.0 
percent higher (with a standard error of 10.1 percent). Once again, results are similar with 
the extended set of controls for baseline family characteristics.
13 
In many instances, these treatment effects are large enough to eliminate 
differences between children in households in the lowest quartile and other children. For 
example, children in the control group in the lowest expenditure quartile have a 
hemoglobin level that is 27.1 percent lower than children in the other three quartiles. 
Among children in households eligible for BDH transfers, the estimates imply that the 
poorest children have a hemoglobin level that is 9.5 percent of a standard deviation 
higher than that of wealthier children. BDH transfers are also predicted to eliminate (or 
more than eliminate) differences in outcomes between households in the first quartile and 
the other three quartiles in fine motor control, short-term memory, and the behavior 
problems scale, and remove at least one-third of the differences in outcomes on the 
vocabulary test, long-term memory, and the test of visual integration.  
To test the robustness of our main results, we present two variants of these 
estimates in Table 5. The left-hand panel shows results that are estimated using the 
largest sample possible for each outcome, so that the sample size varies across outcomes. 
These results also indicate substantial treatment effects among the poorest children. 
However, the effects are between 50 percent and 75 percent as large as those shown in 
Table 3, which are based on the sample of children with no missing values for any 
outcome. The differences in the treatment effects across samples are somewhat puzzling. 
As discussed above, children in the treatment group are not more or less likely than those 
                                                 
13 As above, the average effect sizes are larger if height and the TVIP score are excluded from the 
calculations.    20
in the control group to have missing outcomes and, except for being younger, children 
with and without missing outcomes have similar baseline characteristics. It is possible 
that children for whom some outcomes are missing are, for some unobserved reason, less 
amenable to treatment. Evidence consistent with this idea is presented in Appendix Table 
2, which compares mean outcomes for children with no missing outcomes (who are 
included in the analyses in Table 3), with mean outcomes for children with at least one 
missing outcome (who are excluded from the analyses in Table 3). These results indicate 
that children with at least one missing outcome tend to score worse than others on their 
observed outcomes, even after adjusting for age. It may be that, when examining only 
children for whom all test results are available, we have excluded children with the worst 
health and developmental outcomes who may have benefited least from cash transfers.  
The right-hand panel of Table 5 uses published norms to standardize the measures 
of child height, the TVIP, and the three tests from the Woodcock-Johnson battery.
14 The 
normed scores are transformed into within-sample z-scores, as before. Using published 
norms rather than the raw scores has a negligible effect on our estimated treatment 
effects.  
 
Differences in program effects by child age, child gender, and mother’s education 
One issue of particular importance for the design of interventions is whether there 
are “critical periods” in children’s development. There is broad consensus that adversity 
experienced earlier in life—from the prenatal period through infancy—is particularly 
damaging to children. There is less agreement on how the effects of poor health or 
nutritional deficits experienced later in early childhood compare to those experienced at 
earlier ages, or the extent to which developmental “catch up” is possible once children 
are past infancy. If catch up is impossible or difficult, then interventions that improve 
children’s circumstances may have their largest effects on younger children. A recent 
review of programs to improve child cognitive development makes the case that younger 
children generally benefit more from interventions than older children (Engle et al., 
                                                 
14 Height is converted into age- and gender- specific z-scores using U.S. norms derived from the CDC 
growth charts. The test developers for the TVIP provide age-specific norms that can be used to turn the raw 
score on the test into an age-normed, standardized score; these standardized scores are constructed to have 
a mean (among the sample used for norming) of 100, and a standard deviation of 15. The Woodcock-
Johnson tests are age-normed by converting them into percentiles provided by the test developer.   21
2007). The literature on conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America also 
provides some hints of larger program effects on the nutritional status of younger 
children. Attanasio et al. (2005) report that the Familias en Acción program in Colombia 
increased height among children younger than 24 months, but not among older children; 
Rivera et al. (2004) conclude that Oportunidades transfers improved child height but only 
for children age 6 months or younger at the time they started receiving transfers, and only 
for children with below-median socioeconomic status.  
To investigate this issue, we estimated variants of equation (3) which permit the 
treatment effects and the effect of being in the bottom quartile to differ across younger 
(ages 3 and 4) and older (ages 5 to 7) children. The results in the top panel in Table 6 
indicate that the treatment effects are very similar across older and younger children. 
Young children have a somewhat larger mean treatment effect for physical outcomes than 
older children. However, in no case are coefficients for younger and older children 
significantly different from each other. It should be noted, however, that even the 
youngest children in the sample were typically more than 18 months old when the 
transfers became available. It is possible that children who were infants when the 
transfers began will (eventually) benefit more than those who were older.  
There may also be different program effects for boys and girls—either because of 
pre-existing differences in outcomes between them, or because transfers are used in a 
way that favors offspring of one gender over the other. Plausibly, this could result from 
the fact that BDH transfers are made to women rather than men. If pooling of household 
resources is incomplete, as predicted by a variety of non-unitary models of household 
behavior (for example, Chiappori, 1988; 1992; Bourguignon et al., 1993) and if women 
and men have different preferences regarding investments in their male and female 
offspring, then the gender of the transfer recipient may affect the relative impact on the 
health and development of boys and girls. There is some evidence that transfers made to 
women have larger effects on the health of girls than boys. Thomas (1994) shows that in 
Brazil non-labor income of the mother has a significantly larger impact on the height of 
girls than boys. Duflo (2003) shows that large cash transfers made to elderly women in 
South Africa improve the nutritional status of young girls, but not of boys; transfers made 
to elderly men have no discernible effect on the nutritional status of either girls or boys.   22
In research that is most closely related to the findings in this paper, Schady and Rosero 
(2007) show that the food Engel curve for households randomly assigned to receive BDH 
transfers is significantly above that of households assigned to receive no transfers; when 
they disaggregate the results to take account of differences in the number of boys and 
girls in a household, the effect of the BDH transfer on the food Engel curve rises 
monotonically with the fraction of children in the household who are girls.  
  The middle panel in Table 6 shows that BDH program effects are consistently 
larger among girls than boys—both for the poorest children, and for relatively better-off 
children. In some cases, these differences in program effects by the gender of the child 
are significant. For instance, for children in the poorest quartile, the mean effect for 
cognitive and behavioral measures on girls is 39.0 percent of a standard deviations (with 
a standard error of 11.6 percent), while that for boys is only 11.3 percent of a standard 
deviation (with a standard error of 12.1 percent); this difference in program effects for 
boys and girls is significant at the 5 percent level. The results also indicate that, relative 
to children in the top three expenditure quartiles, girls in the first quartile tend to be more 
disadvantaged than boys in the absence of the BDH transfers: girls in the control group in 
the first quartile have cognitive and behavioral outcomes that are 28.7 percent of a 
standard deviation lower than those in the other three quartiles, while boys in the control 
group in the first quartile have outcomes that are only 14.2 percent of a standard 
deviation lower than those in the other three quartiles. The BDH appears to help equalize 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes between children of higher and lower socioeconomic 
status among girls (where the differences are large) as well as among boys (where the 
differences are smaller). 
  Finally, we compare treatment effects for children whose mothers have “low” 
levels of schooling (incomplete primary or less) with those whose mothers have “high” 
levels of schooling (complete primary or more). Education is often thought to be a key 
constraint for the adoption of health-seeking behaviors among the poor in developing 
countries. For instance, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) report that access to piped water 
reduces the incidence of diarrhea in India, but only for educated mothers. The inclusion 
of health education for mothers in conditional cash transfer programs such as 
Oportunidades is predicated on the idea that education and cash transfers are   23
complements. The results in the bottom panel in Table 6 provide some support for this 
view. Children in the poorest quartile in our sample tend to have worse health and 
development outcomes if their mothers also have low education levels. There is also 
some evidence of larger treatment effects among children whose mothers have at least 
complete primary schooling, although these differences are only significant for children 
in the top three income quartiles. 
 
Mechanisms 
As noted above, there are several mechanisms through which cash transfers may 
influence children’s health and development. These include improvements in nutrition; 
improvements in health care; and improvements in parenting. Although we cannot 
formally test the mechanisms through which the effects operate—doing so would require 
further randomized interventions—we can examine whether there is evidence that 
nutrition, health care and parenting in fact improved among families that were eligible for 
transfers.  
  We first examine several maternal outcomes that reflect wealth and nutritional 
status, as well as maternal mental health and parenting. The first two rows of Table 7 
indicate that, as expected, the treated mothers perceive themselves to be better-off than 
those in the control group: they place themselves higher on the “Ecuador” and 
“community” ladders. We take this as evidence that transfers were spent in a way that 
made mothers better off. 
The third row of Table 7 indicates that mothers in the treatment group experience 
improvements in their hemoglobin levels, and that the gains are largest for those in the 
poorest families. These results for mothers are remarkably similar to those for children, 
suggesting that improvements in the diets of all family members may have improved. 
These results are also consistent with those reported in Schady and Rosero (2007), who 
show that the food share of households in the BDH treatment group increased at all 
expenditure levels.
15 
                                                 
15The follow-up survey collected information on the number of times in the last week family members had 
consumed a number of foods, including liver, cow viscera, bread, chard or spinach, citrus fruits, other 
fruits, carrots or squash, soda or ice cream, cookies or pastry, fried foods, and candy. We find no clear 
evidence of higher reported consumption of these foods among households in the treatment group.   24
Further evidence that increases in food consumption may have been important is 
found in Table 8. In the follow-up survey, respondents who reported receiving BDH 
transfers were asked what they did with the additional cash. Nearly half (49.2 percent) 
reported that they spent all or most of the transfer on food, with much smaller fractions 
reporting that they spent all or most of the transfer on clothing (11.4 percent), education 
(10.7 percent), and health care (7.9 percent). The vast majority reported that BDH 
transfers were not spent on goods for their husbands. The survey also asked the mothers 
who in the household (the mother, her partner or husband, or both) decided whether the 
transfers should be spent on food, clothing, etc. For each type of expenditure, fewer than 
2 percent of women reported that her husband or partner alone made decisions on how to 
spend the BDH transfer, and the majority indicated that they made spending decisions 
alone.  
  Although the poorest mothers in the treatment group appear to have experienced 
improvements in their perceived wealth and physical health, the same is not true for 
mental health. The results in Table 7 indicate that the treatment effects for depression and 
the HOME score (which measures parenting quality) are positive for mothers in the 
bottom quartile. However, these effects are not statistically significant. The treatment 
effect for perceived stress is small, negative and insignificant. The final two rows indicate 
that mothers in the treatment group did not work fewer hours than those in the control 
group. (Similar conclusions are obtained if we look at employment indicators rather than 
measures of weekly work hours.) These results suggest that it is unlikely that 
improvements in children’s outcomes are the result of more responsive or more intensive 
parenting. 
  We next examine whether treated children receive more health care than untreated 
children, focusing on two outcomes: whether or not a child had a “growth control” check-
up in the past 6 months, and whether the child had a parasite treatment in the past 12 
months. Growth control visits are for preventive care: during the visit, children’s growth 
is monitored, supplements and intestinal parasite treatments are prescribed if necessary, 
and vaccines are administered. Although visits to public clinics are free, it may be that 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, measurement error in dietary recall of foods eaten by family members is high, even using a 24-
hour rather than a 1-week recall period (Baranowski, Sprague, Baranowski and Harrison, 1991).   25
cash transfers defray transportation costs or make it possible to attend higher-quality 
private clinics. Intestinal parasites are widespread among children in Ecuador and are 
associated with stunting and anemia (Sackey, Weigel, and Armijos, 2003). Regular 
treatments are necessary since re-infection is common. 
  The results in the lower panel of Table 7 do not show significant treatment effects 
on the use of growth control visits, either among the poorest or wealthier children. This 
result is particularly interesting because, if cash transfers had been perceived by mothers 
to be conditional on health center visits (as they were originally intended to be), we 
would expect to observe more health center visits among those in the treatment group. 
Although children in the treatment group were not more likely to have growth control 
visits, they were more likely to receive parasite treatments. Among children in the bottom 
quartile, those in the treatment group were 20.7 percentage points more likely than those 
in the control group to be treated. (The standard error is 5.9 percentage points.) The 
treatment effects are large enough for the poorest children to completely offset the main 
effects of being poor. Smaller, although still positive and significant, treatment effects are 
also found for children in the upper expenditure quartiles. Note that the positive treatment 
effects for parasite treatments are not necessarily in conflict with the lack of treatment 
effects for growth control visits. Parasite treatments can be obtained in places other than 
health centers. Mothers whose children received parasite treatments were asked where the 
medications were obtained: 40.5 percent said they “bought them,” in comparison to 32.2 
percent who received them from health centers, 10.2 percent who said they received them 
from non-clinic-based public programs, and 10.1 who received them from schools (with 
the remaining 7 percent replying “other” or “don’t know”.) It is therefore possible that 
the cash transfers were used to purchase treatments for intestinal parasites in the market. 
The results for parasite treatments are consistent with the positive treatment effects for 
hemoglobin, since parasite infections can reduce hemoglobin levels. 
A final outcome we examined was school enrollment. It is possible that children 
in the treatment group were more likely to be sent to school, producing better cognitive 
outcomes. Conversely, improvements in cognitive performance or health could lead to 
earlier enrollment in school. However, as shown in the bottom row of Table 7, the 
treatment effects for school enrollment are positive but small and imprecisely estimated.   26
Assessing the magnitude of the treatment effects 
The results presented above indicate that children who were eligible for cash 
transfers generally have better physical and cognitive outcomes than children in the 
control group. The treatment effects are largest for the poorest children. Furthermore, 
most of the outcomes we study are associated with per capita expenditure, especially at 
very low expenditure levels. One simple explanation for this pattern of results is that the 
BDH transfers move families along the Engel curves that relate outcomes to total 
expenditure. In this view, a dollar is a dollar: a treatment-group child whose family 
receives $15 a month in BDH transfers will have outcomes that are, on average, identical 
to those of a control-group child whose family has the same expenditure level without the 
transfer. 
There are, however, several reasons why this explanation may be incorrect. If the 
effects of cash transfers take time to change children’s health and developmental 
outcomes, the treatment effects could be small relative to changes suggested by estimates 
of expenditure elasticities. On the other hand, it is possible that the treatment effects 
could exceed those implied by cross-sectional expenditure elasticities. The fact that the 
BDH was advertised as a social program intended to benefit children could have 
produced a “flypaper” effect, so that families used these transfers differently from other 
sources of income. In the United States, for example, studies of food stamp “cash outs” 
suggest that families spend a disproportionate share of their food stamp income on food 
(Fraker, Martini, and Ohls, 1995; Currie, 1998).
16 In addition, the fact that transfers were 
made to women may have increased women’s bargaining capacity within the household, 
and shifted expenditure towards goods that women prefer. Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales 
(1997) use data from the United Kingdom to show that a reform which replaced a 
universal child benefit, which had primarily consisted of reductions in taxes withheld 
from the paycheck of a child’s father, with a direct cash payment made to the child’s 
mother resulted in substantial increases in expenditures on children’s clothing. Thomas 
(1990) shows that in urban Brazil non-earned maternal income has an effect on nutrient 
                                                 
16 See Jacoby, 2002 for evidence of flypaper effects associated with a school feeding program in the 
Philippines.   27
demand that is between four and seven times larger than the corresponding effect of non-
earned paternal income.  
We use two methods to examine whether the treatment effects we observe are 
consistent with movements along an Engel curve. The first is a simple nonparametric 
strategy: we estimate nonparametric regressions of child outcomes on crude estimates of 
the log of per capita expenditure at follow-up for those in the treatment and control 
groups. For those in the control group, we set per capita expenditure equal to its baseline 
value. For those in the treatment group, we add $11 to the imputed baseline monthly 
family expenditure and divide by the number of household members at baseline ($11 is 
the average BDH transfer across those in the treatment group who do and do not take up 
the program). This has the effect of shifting the non-parametric Engel curve for those in 
the treatment group to the right. If the BDH program simply moves families along the 
Engel curve, the “shifted” Engel curve for the treatment group should lie on top of the 
Engel curve for the control group.
17  
Our second strategy is to estimate and compare parametric Engel curves for the 
treatment and control groups. Specifically, for a child i  in the control group, we specify 
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In (5),  i B  equals the probability that the BDH transfer of $15 is received. Although 
program take-up is unlikely to be random, we assume here that all families in the 
treatment group have the same probability of receiving the $15 transfer. i B  is set to 0.83, 
the fraction of children in the analysis sample whose mothers report having received the 
bono since the program started.  
  We estimate a model that combines (4) and (5). Specifically, we estimate: 
                                                 
17 This strategy abstracts from possible treatment effects on labor supply or savings.   28
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where  i T is an indicator that i is in the treatment group. Under the null hypothesis that the 
treatment effects work though movements along the Engel curve, then 
/
1 1 α α =  (or, in 
words, the expenditure elasticities should be identical for the treatment and control 
groups) and 0
/
0 = α (the intercept for the Engel curve should be the same for treatment and 
control groups). 
  The nonparametric results, shown in Figure 5, do not indicate that transfers work 
by moving families along Engel curves that relate child outcomes to per capita 
expenditure. For several of the outcomes—notably hemoglobin, the TVIP score, the tests 
of short-term memory (WJ-2) and visual integration (WJ-5), and behavior problems—the 
Engel curves for children in the treatment group have very different shapes from those of 
children in the control group. Most obviously, and consistent with the results shown in 
Table 4, they diverge the most for the poorest children. For two outcomes—fine motor 
control and long-term memory (WJ-1)—the Engel curves for children in the treatment 
group lie above those for children in the control group at all expenditure levels. 
  Estimates of the parametric versions of these regressions are shown in Table 9. In 
the top panels, estimated using children from all quartiles, the expenditure elasticities for 
children in the control group exceed those for children in the treatment group, and the 
treatment group intercept is large and positive. However, for this group, the test that the 
expenditure elasticities are equal, and the joint test of equal expenditure elasticities and a 
zero treatment group intercept, can be rejected only for physical outcomes. The 
differences between the treatment and control groups are more apparent in the bottom 
panel, which shows results for children in the lowest quartile. The hypothesis that the 
data from the two samples lie along the same Engel curve can be rejected for all groups 
of outcomes.  
In sum, the treatment effects we find are large relative to the size of estimates of 
expenditure elasticities. We do not know whether this is because the transfers are given to 
mothers, who prefer to spend more on their children, or whether the “marketing” of the 
BDH as a program to benefit children influenced how transfers were used.    29
VI. Conclusion 
This paper uses the randomized introduction of a new social program in rural 
Ecuador to assess the impact of cash transfers on child health and development. We find 
that relatively modest unconditional cash transfers raised the hemoglobin levels of the 
poorest children, improved fine motor control, improved cognitive outcomes, and led to a 
reduction in reported behavioral problems. We also show that program effects on 
cognitive development were generally larger for girls than boys, and for children with 
more highly-educated mothers. 
The implied program effects are much larger than would be expected from the 
cross-sectional elasticities of outcomes with respect to expenditures for households in the 
control group. The findings we present suggest that these gains may have been 
accomplished though better nutrition and the use of de-worming medication, although not 
through the use of growth monitoring check-ups and better parenting. 
The results in this paper have important implications for the design of programs 
that aim to improve outcomes in early childhood. A recent review paper on strategies to 
promote child development in the developing world pays scant attention to cash transfers 
(Engle et al., 2007). Instead, the review stresses the importance of programs that 
“(integrate) health, nutrition, education, social, and economic development” (Engle et al., 
p. 234). In rural Ecuador, a much simpler program—one that made relatively modest cash 
transfers to poor women—led to substantial improvements in child outcomes, especially 
for the poorest children in the sample. This complements earlier results based on quasi-
experimental methods for South Africa (Duflo, 2003; Case, 2001; Agüero, Carter, and 
Woolard, 2006), and Mexico (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2006). 
  Conditional cash transfer programs have caught the attention of policy-makers in 
numerous countries, for good reason. Conditionality may serve to screen less needy 
families out of the program, reducing budgetary costs. The requirement that children be 
taken to health clinics makes sense if parents lack knowledge about the value of health 
care, or if mothers do not have the leverage within families to make sure that children 
receive appropriate medical care. Furthermore, the imposition of conditionality may 
increase the political demand for increases in the numbers and improvements in the 
quality of public health clinics. The abysmal quality of clinics in many poor countries is   30
becoming increasingly well-documented (for example, Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; 
Banerjee, Duflo and Deaton, 2004; Das and Hammer 2005). Governments that require 
families to use clinics may be forced to confront problems of absenteeism and the lack of 
supplies and equipment.  
However, conditionality also imposes costs. Requiring families to use health 
clinics may not be feasible in places where health centers are few and far between, or are 
of low quality. The families that self-select out of the program, because of the high costs 
of getting to clinics, may be those whose children are most at risk for poor outcomes. 
Unconditional transfers will improve the welfare of poor families regardless of how the 
money is spent and, as the results of this paper indicate, may also improve child health 
and development.  
  More research is required in several areas. First, we do not know whether adding 
conditionality to the BDH would have improved or weakened the beneficial effects—
either result is possible in theory. If conditionality is imposed in the future, we plan to 
extend this study to examine its effects. Second, we do not know whether the BDH will 
have larger effects on the development of the younger children in our sample, including 
children who were in utero during the treatment. Existing evidence suggests that health 
and nutrition very early in life have larger effects on children’s outcomes than health and 
nutrition at later ages. We hope to examine this in the future, when these children are old 
enough to take the cognitive tests examined in this paper. 
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Graphs by Treatment group
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Note: The dashed line is for the treatment group; expenditure is measured as baseline expenditure plus the average BDH transfer. 
The solid line is for the control group; expenditure is measured baseline expenditure. 
   41
Table 1: Comparison of families which were eligible and ineligible for the sample 
   Former Bono Solidario 
recipients  Newly eligible 
Observations 26,231  9,573 
% of row  73.3%  26.7%  At least one child 
age 6 or older 







Observations 4,456  17,987 
% of row  19.9%  80.2%  No children age 6 or 
older 






Note: These computations are for the group of 58,247 urban and rural families who were in 
Selben quintiles 1 & 2 and had at least one child in the household of any age, making them BDH-
eligible. This group is classified into those who are former Bono recipients and those who are 
newly eligible for the BDH (across the columns), and those who had at least 1 child age 6 and 
older and those who had no children age 6 or older (down the rows). Our sample was drawn from 
the17,987 families in the bottom right portion of the table: newly eligible families with no 
children age 6 or older. 
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Table 2: Descriptive baseline statistics: analysis sample 
    Full sample  Families in lowest quartile 
   Treatment Control  P-value, 
diff  Treatment Control  P-value, 
diff 
Family-level variables (observations=1,124 in full sample, 268 in lowest quartile) 
Imputed per capita 
expenditure    36.68 
(0.79) 
38.39 
(1.10)  1.58  21.57 
(0.34) 
22.13 
(0.54)  0.78 
ln(imputed per capita 
expenditure)    3.54 
(0.02) 
3.57 





Mother’s age in years    23.74 
(0.13) 
23.81 





Mother’s education in 
years    7.01 
(0.16) 
6.79 





Mother living with 
husband    0.70 
(0.02) 
0.67 





# Family members    4.79 
(0.11) 
4.73 






interviews    22.61 
(0.29) 
22.47 





Child-level variables (observations=1,479 in full sample, 365 in lowest quartile) 
Indicator: Child is male    0.49 
(0.01) 
0.53 





Child’s age in months    39.10 
(0.65) 
38.40 






score (US norms)    –1.12 
(0.08) 
–1.11 






(g/dl)    10.43 
(0.08) 
10.36 





Child’s TVIP score 
(standardized)    81.25 
(0.74) 
82.91 






              
Notes: The sample consists of the group of children ages 3 to 7 (and their families) for whom all 
8 child outcomes studied in this paper are non-missing. Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the parish level. The child’s baseline hemoglobin is elevation adjusted. The child’s 
baseline TVIP score has been normed according to instructions from the test developer (M=100, 
SD=15). Note that the baseline TVIP is available only for the subsample of children who were at 
least 36 months of age at baseline.   43
Table 3: Treatment effects: children’s outcomes 
  Controls for age 
and gender    Controls for age, gender and 
baseline family characteristics 
Elevation-adjusted hemoglobin  0.116 
(0.111)    0.117 
(0.102) 
Height  0.043 
(0.058)    0.034 
(0.050) 
Fine motor control   0.160 
(0.076)    0.171 
(0.074) 
TVIP score (receptive vocabulary)  0.011 
(0.108)    0.021 
(0.099) 
WJ-1 score (long-term memory)  0.192 
(0.105)    0.230 
(0.106) 
WJ-2 score (short-term memory)  0.034 
(0.102)    0.029 
(0.098) 
WJ-5 (visual integration)  0.119 
(0.100)    0.145 
(0.072) 
Behavior problems scale  0.150 
(0.103)    0.146 
(0.099) 
 Mean  effect  sizes 
Physical measures  0.106 
(0.049)    0.107 
(0.040) 
Cognitive and behavioral measures  0.101 
(0.071)    0.114 
(0.060) 
All measures  0.103 
(0.056)    0.112 
(0.045) 
Observations 1,479    1,389 
Note: All dependent variables have been converted to z-scores by subtracting the sample median 
and dividing by the standard deviation. The measures of fine motor control and behavior 
problems have had their signs reversed so that higher values correspond to better outcomes (i.e. 
better fine motor control and fewer behavior problems). The sample is restricted to all children 
ages 3 to 7 years at follow-up, for whom all eight outcomes are measured. The controls for 
baseline family characteristics include the natural logarithm of imputed family expenditure, an 
indicator for whether the mother lived with a husband at baseline, the mother’s years of education 
and age, indicators for the numbers of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 14, 15 to 44, 
45 to 64 and 64 or older) crossed with gender, and the mother’s TVIP score. Standard errors are 
clustered at the parish level. 
.Table 4: Treatment effects with baseline expenditure interactions: children’s 
outcomes 
    Controls for age and gender 






























































TVIP score (receptive 












WJ-1 score (long-term 












WJ-2 score (short-term 




































 Mean effect sizes 












Cognitive and behavioral 
























             
Note: 1,479 observations without extended controls, and 1,389 observations with extended 
controls. The sample is restricted to all children ages 3 to 7 years at follow-up for whom all eight 
outcomes are measured. All dependent variables are measured as z-scores by subtracting the 
sample median and dividing by the standard deviation. The measures of fine motor control and 
behavior problems have had their signs reversed, so that higher values correspond to better 
outcomes (i.e. better fine motor control and fewer behavior problems). The baseline family 
characteristics are listed in the note to Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. 
 Table 5: Robustness checks 
  Largest sample possible for each 
outcome   
Published norms with 
analysis sample (obs: 
1,448) 












Hemoglobin 1,763  0.270 
(0.111) 
0.047 




Height / Height-for-age Z 
score (for US norms)  2,157  0.015 
(0.082) 
–0.012 




Fine motor control   2,116  0.148 
(0.096) 
0.074 




TVIP score (receptive 
vocabulary)  2,020  0.113 
(0.124) 
–0.046 




WJ-1 score (long-term 
memory)  2,096  0.136 
(0.097) 
0.124 




WJ-2 score (short-term 
memory)  2,067  0.091 
(0.136) 
–0.047 




WJ-5 (visual integration)  1,948  0.229 
(0.149) 
–0.012 




Behavior problems  2,160  0.246 
(0.142) 
0.018 




 Mean  effect  sizes 
Physical measures    0.144 
(0.058) 
0.022 




Cognitive & behavioral 
measures    0.163 
(0.088) 
0.008 




All measures    0.156 
(0.070) 
0.013 




            
Note: Dependent variables are measured as z-scores by subtracting the sample median and 
dividing by the standard deviation. The measures of fine motor control and behavior problems 
have had their signs reversed, so that higher values correspond to better outcomes (i.e. better fine 
motor control and fewer behavior problems). Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. The 
sample using published norms has 31 fewer observations than the sample used in Table 4 
because, in these cases, one or more outcomes took on values that could not be normed using the 




























By age:  3 and 4 year olds  5, 6, and 7 year olds  






































By sex:  Girls  Boys 






































By mother’s education:  Incomplete primary or less  Complete primary or more  






































        
Notes: Asterisks indicate that the hypothesis of equality of the coefficient for boys (older 
children) and girls (younger children) can be rejected at the 5% level (*) or the 1% level (**). The 
results are based on regressions that pool boys and girls (older and younger children) but permit 
the coefficients on the treatment-expenditure interactions and the indicator of being in the 1
st 
quartile to differ across boys and girls (older and younger children). Four observations were 
dropped in the regressions by mother’s education due to missing values for education at baseline. 
All regressions include an indicator for the child’s sex and a complete set of month-of-age 
indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. 
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Table 7: Program effects on maternal health, parenting and health care 








Outcomes for mothers 




































Work hours per week, paid jobs 






Work hours per week, all jobs 






Health care and schooling outcomes 
Child had growth control in last 6 






Child had parasite treatment in 






Child in a preschool or grade 






       
Notes: Regressions for mother’s outcomes control for the age of the mother (in 10-year 
age bands). Regressions for children control for the child’s age and gender. Standard 
errors are clustered at the parish level. The measures of depressive symptoms, perceived 
stress, and the HOME score are coded so that higher values correspond with better 
outcomes.  
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Table 8: Respondent’s report of what BDH transfers were spent on 
 All  Most  A  little  None 
Food  19.21 30.02 30.19 20.58 
Health 3.04  4.83  24.51  67.62 
Housing  0.90 1.26 4.33  93.50 
Education 4.29  6.44  23.79  65.47 
Transportation ---  0.72 38.81  60.47 
Clothes 4.51  6.86  22.74  65.88 
Goods for 
husband  -- --  1.65  98.35 
      
Note: Mothers were asked “How much of the bono was spent on [item listed I first 
column]?” Each row of the table shows the distribution of mothers’ responses to these 
questions. The sample consists of all mothers of children in the analysis sample who 
reported receiving BDH transfers 
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Table 9: Tests of Engel curve hypothesis 



































(0.097)  0.420 0.323 





(0.078)  0.211 0.113 

















(0.196)  0.001 0.000 





(0.162)  0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: The estimates shown are based on estimates of equation (6). A complete set of 
indicators for the age in months of the child were included, as was an indicator for the 
child’s sex. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.   50
Appendix Table 1: Baseline characteristics of all children at baseline, children in 
both baseline and follow-up surveys, and children in the analysis sample. 
  Baseline 
 
Follow-up Analysis  sample 
  Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs 
  Household and mother’s characteristics 
Imputed  log  expenditure  3.48 1,561 3.48 1,553 3.50 1,124 
Mother’s age in years  23.62  1,656  23.63  1,551  23.77  1,122 
Mother’s  education  in  years 6.80 1,654 6.83 1,549 6.94 1,120 
Mother living with husband  0.692 1,658 0.690 1,553 0.688 1,124 
#  family  members  4.74 1,658 4.75 1,553 4.77 1,124 
In  treatment  group  0.665 1,658 0.672 1,553 0.680 1,124 
Months between interviews      22.58  1,553  22.57  1,124 
Received bono (bank 
records)      0.568 1,513 0.574 1,100 
Received bono (reported)      0.567  1,553  0.573  1,124 
 Children’s  characteristics 
Indicator: child is male  0.501  2,359  0.505  2,204  0.502  1,479 
Child’s  age  in  months  37.49 2,359 37.43 2,204 38.88 1,479 
Child’s height-for-age z-
score (US norms)  -1.225 2,255 -1.219 2,111  -1.12  1,419 
Child’s  hemoglobin  10.39 2,098 10.38 1,968 10.41 1,323 
Child’s standardized TVIP 
score  81.45 1,169 81.66 1,087  799  81.78 
        
Notes: Only children at baseline who would have been between ages 36 and 95 months at 
follow-up are included in this analysis. Ages for children lost at follow-up were imputed 
based on mean number of months between baseline and follow-up in each parish. The 
child’s TVIP is measured only for children who were at least 36 months old at baseline. 
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Appendix Table 2: Means (standard deviations) of outcome variables by whether 





At least one missing 
outcome 
  Mean (Std.Dev)  Mean 





Age in months  61.41 
(14.19) 
56.96 
(14.44)  718  5.74 
(0.00) 
Hemoglobin  –0.024 
(1.000) 
–0.183 
(0.988)  284  0.77 
(0.44) 
Height   0.149 
(0.990) 
–0.152 
(0.992)  678  1.52 
(0.13) 
Fine motor control   –0.080 
(0.922) 
–0.445 
(1.120)  637  4.35 
(0.00) 





(0.968)  541  2.76 
(0.01) 





(0.986)  617  3.65 
(0.00) 












(1.037)  469  0.70 
(0.49) 
Behavior problems   –0.041 
(0.993) 
–0.003 
(1.015)  681  0.43 
(0.67) 
Note: All child outcomes except age have been converted to z-scores, and the signs of 
fine motor control and behavior problems have been reversed so that higher values 
correspond to better outcomes. The last column shows t-tests for whether the mean for 
the sample with no missing outcomes is equal to that for the sample with missing 
outcomes. For all variables except age, variables are age- and sex- adjusted, i.e. the test is 
based on a regression of each variable on an indicator for whether the child has at least 
one missing outcome, a complete set of age indicators, and an indicator of the child is 
male. These regressions have standard errors that are clustered at the parish level. 
 